gress will lose the most practical 6 of its few remaining tools for ensuring federal administrative fidelity to legislative intentions. This Note argues, however, that the Constitution permits Congress to create executive agencies with substantial autonomy,' regardless of whether they are called independent.
Because autonomy requires insulation from politically motivated removal, 8 Section I begins by analyzing the reach of the President's removal power. It then offers a reinterpretation of terms in Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 9 the key modern case holding that Congress may constrain the President's removal power. Distinguishing between presidential powers, which belong to the President alone, and more general executive powers, which do not, allows Congress to use agency autonomy as a constraint on presidential discretion and gives Congress an option besides acquiescence or impeachment when confronted by presidential disregard of the legislative will.
Agency autonomy does not embrace the rejected concept of a plural exmay be vested in agencies independent of executive "policy control" only if President is allowed to remove officials "for cause" including "failure of confidence"); Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup. CT. REv. 41 (forthcoming) (Congress may not forbid presidential removal of policy-making official who refuses order to take legal act within official's jurisdiction); Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 625 (1984) (offering several considerations, notably "fairness," that might affect the constitutionality of the independent exercise of executive power, but in context of overriding desire for a "unitary, competent President to serve as check against legislative hegemony"); Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent Officers as Checks on Abuses of Executive Power, 63 B.U.L. REv. 59, 103 (1983) (suggesting independent agencies be limited to "non-political" roles); Note, supra note 3, at 1766 (distinction between executive and independent agencies "should now be discarded" in favor of full presidential control). 6. The threat of agency autonomy is a more practical tool for checking the executive than are statutes reducing executive discretion or setting penalties for violations. Such statutes would curtail agencies' abilities to react to unforeseen contingencies, and would make complex programs impossible by eliminating discretion to make rules filling out congressional intent. The threat of agency autonomy will color how Presidents and their subordinates use their discretion. See infra note 51. To date, Congress' other attempts to shape this discretion have tended to fail. See infra note 40. In any case, a statute setting penalites for, say, negligent or willful misconstruction of congressional intent might not be enforced by the administration which chose the interpretation. Attempting to allow other parties a right of action might create standing problems.
Autonomous agencies are a tool, not a panacea; they may, for example, be more subject to capture by special interests than more politically accountable bodies. Congressional power to reduce presidential control does not necessarily translate into congressional control.
7. "Autonomy" in this Note refers to protection from political pressure by the President, most commonly achieved by protecting high officials from dismissal without cause. See supra note 1.
8. See supra note 1. Even without the power to fire, the President's power to appoint top agency personnel assures a high degree of control of agency activity. See Goodsell & Gayo, Appointive Control of Federal Regulatory Commissions, 23 ADMIN. L. REv. 291 (1971) (between 1945 and 1970, enough commissioners on seven major regulatory commissions resigned before completion of statutory term to allow newly-elected Presidents to appoint controlling majorities within average of 21 months). However, agencies enjoy legal and psychological autonomy if Congress shields their chiefs from presidential removal. Greater agency autonomy limits political manipulation by the President without necessarily increasing congressional control. As political control and accountability to the President may be desirable ends, agency autonomy may often be undesirable for policy reasons.
9. 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (unanimous decision).
ecutive, nor does it amount to a fourth branch of government. Section II demonstrates that the degree of autonomy implied by the presidentialexecutive distinction is consistent with the constitutional text, structural constitutional theory, the intent of the Framers, a long history of legislative practice, and much administrative history as well. Section III outlines how the presidential-executive distinction can work in practice, and applies it to pending allegations that agencies whose top officials do not serve at the pleasure of the President violate the separation of powers when they take executive actions.
I. THE NEW THREAT TO AGENCY AUTONOMY

A. The Pending Issue
Emboldened by recent Supreme Court cases suggesting that the President has plenary power over the executive branch, and that congressionally imposed constraints on the removal power may be unconstitutional, 1° private parties are increasingly challenging Congress' power to insulate agencies such as the FTC or the Federal Reserve Board from presidential control. 1 Most commonly, a plaintiff claims injuries caused by authority constitutionally assigned to the executive branch but exercised by an officer alleged to be outside it, or a defendant seeks to block an administrative agency's investigation or enforcement action. These arguments share three claims: (1) All high-ranking executive officials are constitutionally removable by the President; (2) Any high-ranking official who is not removable by the President is by definition not in the executive branch; (3) An agency headed by an official who is not in the executive branch cannot constitutionally exercise any power that is reserved to the executive branch. To date, the Supreme Court has endorsed only the third claim." 2 The Court should go no further. 1 3
B. The Jurisprudential Roots of the Problem
The Constitution is silent on whether Congress or the President ultimately controls the ordinary removal of high officials, 14 and the Supreme Court has vacillated on the issue. At first the Court allowed Congress freedom to define presidential authority over subordinate parts of the executive branch; later it suggested that the President possessed illimitable removal power; then it reaffirmed congressional authority. Now the Court has, at least in dicta, again approved presidential control." 5 The 14. Moreover, the debates at the Constitutional Conventions do not provide much illumination. The delegates "displayed a notable lack of interest in the organization of the executive branch." L. But in Myers v. United States," 0 the first modern case to examine the extent to which an agency or its chief officer could be insulated from presidential control, the Supreme Court held that a statute requiring Senate concurrence in presidential removal of a first class postmaster was unconstitutional.
WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS
2 1 The theory and language of Myers were extraordinarily broad, splitting federal power into three rigidly divided branches, with administrative powers reserved largely to the President. 22 Yet the holding did no more than strike down the Senate's attempt to insert itself into the removal mechanism. 2 " Properly understood, Myers stands only for the proposition that Congress may not add to its constitutionally specified impeachment powers by asserting a veto power over removal of personnel outside the legislative branch. 2 4 The dicta in Myers would constrain Congress far more, but the Court said the case presented only the question of whether "the President has the exclusive power of removing executive officers of the United States." 2 5 To rule that one house of Congress may not require that the President get its assent in order to remove an executive official is not necessarily to rule that Congress cannot constrain the President's removal power. 2 Distinguishing "purely executive" governmental functions in Myers that could not be committed to so-called independent agencies, the Court located the FTC's role within another, vague, class of functions that could constitutionally be committed to officials at least partially shielded from presidential removal. The elements that belong to the latter group have been held to include legislative, "quasi-legislative," and "quasi-judicial" powers and functions. 2 9
C. The Presidential-Executive Distinction
Although it achieved the correct result, Humphrey's Executor obscured the distinction between presidential functions, which the Constitution reserves to the President," 0 and executive functions, which can be performed by any official in the executive branch." 1 The "purely executive" 31. See infra notes 146-63 and accompanying text (examples). Despite the syntactical pairings of the first three articles which "vest" powers, the terms "legislative Powers" and "a Congress"; "executive Power" and "a President"; and "judicial Power" and "one supreme Court" do not establish equivalences. In law they each derive their meaning from the full text of the Constitution. 3189-91 (1986) , then Presidential removal for specified cause suffices for an officer to be in the executive branch. There is no reason to read Article II as requiring more control than does Article I. This alone suffices to place most independent agencies in the executive branch. See supra note I (independent agencies grouped by removal provisions); see also infra text accompanying notes 78-84 (analogy to Article III suggests Congress has great freedom to structure executive branch).
34. Reading the statutes creating independent agencies as having created agencies with autonomy from presidential political direction but still within the executive branch would serve one of the first values of constitutional adjudication, that of resolution of doubiful issues to avoid constitutional questions. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring in judgment).
35. Regarding "independent" agencies as highly autonomous parts of the executive branch has theoretical advantages. The argument that "independent" agencies are outside the executive branch and yet constitutional faces the obvious doctrinal difficulty that the Constitution speaks only of three branches of government. Further, no such classification system can resolve the question of why, in principle, the legislature should be permitted to assign "quasi-" legislative and judicial powers, but not executive powers, to "independent" agencies.
The Once the narrow set of presidential functions is understood and identified, Congress should not be permitted to limit the President's control over those functions. 
Reduced Congressional Authority in Modern Separation of Powers Jurisprudence
A misunderstanding of Myers and Humphrey's Executor, neglecting the difference between presidential and executive powers, would be particularly harmful today because of the direction of recent separation of powers decisions reducing congressional authority relative to increasing presidential power." 8 The Court's current approach permits Congress to delegate virtually anything to the executive, 3 but restricts Congress' authority to 37. Chief Justice Taft's opinion in Myers, based on a historical reading of "the Decision of 1789," by which the first Congress was supposed to have determined that the President has illimitable removal powers, forcefully stated the contrary view that Congress may rarely, if ever, limit the President's removal authority. 272 U.S. at 52-177. attach strings to its delegations. 40 The effect has been to strengthen the executive greatly at Congress' expense. 4 
Congress Is Losing Control of Expenditures
Congress' control over money once it has been appropriated has been attenuated. 4 The Office of Management and Budget issued a bulletin instructing agencies to ignore CICA. 8 The administration's opposition to CICA culminated in a threat by the Attorney General not to comply with any lower federal court ruling upholding CICA. 4 9 Only this last ultimatum-not the refusal to enforce a law passed by Congress and signed by the President-stirred a Congressional counter-threat to cut the appropriation for the salaries of top Justice Department officials. 
Agency Autonomy Seeks To Discourage Presidential Abuses
The CICA episode demonstrates that the power to place-or threaten to place-certain types of administrative decisions beyond a President's political reach is a highly practical tool for Congress to institutionalize executive compliance with congressional intent. 51 Other attempts to control the misuse of discretion delegated to the executive branch are limited by Congress' diffuse and relatively slow decisionmaking. 52 For example, the disciplinary power of the purse-theoretically Congress' main weapon against presidential abuses-is constrained by the low credibility of a 51. Congress' power to threaten to insulate a post from the President's political control may increase congressional confidence in presidential implementation and thus promote grants of discretion to the President, which might be desirable. In general, presidential discretion promotes administrative flexibility and the gains incident to centralization, accountability, coordination, and efficiency. See Note, supra note 3, at 1773-74 (citing authority). However, wide discretion also increases the President's ability to disregard the legislature's objectives. In order to grant discretion, Congress needs to believe that those entrusted with implementation will faithfully adopt its policy choices. Reserving the threat of insulation increases Congress' chances of having its will obeyed. Admittedly, this is an idealized model. At times compromises required to pass legislation result in a measure that obscures congressional intent. . Among these mechanisms are the creation of independent sources of information, a vast expansion of the congressional staff system, and increased oversight. See Tiefer, supra note 5, at 60-61. However, congressional oversight occurs long after the fact of executive malfeasance. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, July 14, 1986, at A3, col. 1 (Congressman and GAO accuse Department of Defense of mischaracterizing large projects as many small projects, including accounting for each shower stall in building as separate "construction project," to evade statutory spending limits on individual military bases in Honduras).
threat to use it on any project of political significance." 3 In any case, Congress should not be forced to cut a desired program, with the risk of compromising vital military procurement or the interests of innocent beneficiaries, because the branches are fighting."
Congress always retains its ultimate weapon of impeachment." 5 But without any intermediate threats in its arsenal, Congress faces stark choices when confronted with executive misconduct: It can acquiesce in nullification of laws by the executive, it can refuse to fund programs because it distrusts executive implementation, or it can attempt impeachment in circumstances that may not seem to justify such a drastic step. 6 Agency autonomy gives Congress another option, one which this Note argues is practical and constitutional.
II. CONGRESS' POWER To LIMIT PRESIDENTIAL REMOVAL
The President's enumerated power to appoinit 5 7 has been held to connote an inherent or implied power to remove, 58 as have other clauses of Article II. Careful examination of constitutional theory, administrative history, and judicial precedent, however, demonstrates that this removal power is not absolute, and that Congress may thus constrain it by statute to create a degree of agency autonomy. Such constraints derive part of their legitimacy from Congress' power to create and structure the entire executive branch other than the President and Vice President.
53. See L. FIsHER, supra note 38, at 262 (practicalities of government require that Congress give President spending discretion). Of course, Congress has informal control mechanisms available. See supra note 52.
54. While in the Ameron case Congress ultimately did threaten to cut the Justice Department appropriation, it did so only because Justice was seen as challenging the rule of law. At no time did Congress threaten to cut the military budget to emphasize its determination that contracts be awarded competitively, and it is doubtful that such a threat would have been credible.
U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. § 3, ci. 6. It is also true that Congress can block the President's appointments, but this strategy can paralyze government.
56.
As long as Congress retains the power of impeachment, it has the power to enforce presidential obedience. But since Congress reserves this power for the most serious offenses, Presidents enjoy great freedom of maneuver if no intermediate sanctions exist. Impeachment remains a great constitutional counterweight, but its very gravity makes it a poor weapon. See Tiefer, supra note 5, at 99 n.187. Also, impeachment is a long and messy affair, capable of paralyzing both Congress (especially the Senate, which must interrupt regular business to try impeachments) and the bureau or agency whose chief is on trial. 
A. Constitutional Theory
Textual Argument a. The Constitution Vests Only Limited Powers in the President
"The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." '59 Might this vesting of executive power command that the President exercise all of it personally, or perhaps personally control its subdelegation? Both a literal and a structural 0 analysis suggest not: The executive power of the United States is not uniquely vested in the President alone, just as the President's functions are not solely executive. 61 Article II clearly anticipates that there will be "Heads of Departments," and that Congress may, if it chooses, grant them-not the President-the important discretion to appoint inferior officials. 6 2 If Heads of Departments were utterly subject to presidential discretion, the provision would be meaningless; the President would in any case be able to regulate the selection, if not the actual appointment, of inferior officials. 6 3 Similarly, the wording of the necessary and proper clause 6 supports the constitutional validity of the distinction between the President and the executive branch, because it specifically includes departments and officers in a list of potential repositories of federal authority. Further, the power to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution. 67 If it were possible to give content to the President's power without recourse to the text of the constitutional article that purports to define that office, then presumably the first three articles of the Constitution could each have been expressed in a sentence. Those three articles do list the areas in which a branch can go beyond its paradigmatic function,"' but their primary purpose remains to define the contours of each branch and of offices within each branch.
b. Reading the Take Care Clause with the Opinion in Writing Clause
The constitutional provision that the President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" 6 " offers the strongest support for full presidential control over the executive. Yet, the take care clause is not among the major presidential powers of section two, and seems to be at most a modest grant of power. 70 Among the powers explicitly granted to the President is the power to "require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices." 7 ' A broad reading of the take care clause has the effect of reducing this clause-which appears among the grant of major presidential powers in section two-to surplusage. If the President has so much control over the executive that he can fire at will, why put the power to request written opinions in the Constitution?
The Constitution should not be read to have such redundancy. 72 A more reasonable interpretation is that the opinion in writing clause exists because it was not assumed, or at the very least not obvious, that the President had absolute power over Heads of Departments. 73 The take care clause says only that the President "shall Take Care that the laws be faithfully executed," regardless of who executes them-a duty quite different from the single-handed responsibility for executing all the laws. A literal reading of the take care clause confirms the President's duty to ensure that officials obey Congress' instructions; it does not create a presidential power so great that it can be used to frustrate congressional intentions. 4 The take care clause should not be read to grant the President the power to set the political agenda of agencies, nor to replace agency personnel because they enforce congressional mandates in a manner that conflicts with the President's political predilections. 75 Rather, the President's irreducible constitutional role in overseeing the execution of congressional policies is one of general leadership and persuasion, 7 initiating personnel reviews, monitoring to see that officials stay within the bounds that Congress has assigned to them, and perhaps initiating dismissal proceedings before an administrative or judicial tribunal. Congress' relation to inferior federal courts. Yet, it is rarely disputed that Congress has broad, even unlimited, powers to structure the inferior federal courts. 78 Congress may even restrict the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, 7 9 at least up to a point. 80 Just as Congress may determine which Article III court will hear cases, so too can Congress determine which agency will execute its policies. 8 One of the greatest virtues of the executive-presidential distinction is that it offers a middle ground for decision in separation of powers cases other than a retreat to nonjusticiability. The stakes in removal cases-control of the federal machinery-too often create a hydraulic pressure toward absolutism. For example, to argue that the President has illimitable removal power, as Chief Justice Taft did in Myers, calls into question Congress' ability to create offices with limited terms, and undermines its ability to create terms of more than four years. Yet, it is as odd to say that Congress could not shorten the terms of FTC Commissioners to one year as it would be to suggest that every Article III judge's life tenure prohibits Congress from reducing her court's jurisdiction. See Glidden, 370 U.S. at 567-68 (opinion of Harlan, J.) (Congress may narrow jurisdiction of courts, even if this affects pending cases). It might be less odd to limit this claim to sitting Commissioners. Contra Comment, supra, at 585-94. But if the President has illimitable removal power, then Congress should not be allowed to limit the terms of those yet to be named, for this too usurps the removal power. Yet, this last argument cannot be correct as it is tantamount to arguing that a court can require Congress to fund an office not specified in the Constitution, despite the clear command of the appropriations clause, U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. See Glidden, 370 U.S. at 534 (opinion of Harlan, J.) (Congress may repeal tenure or salary of public officials, but not of art. III judges); Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U.S. 99, 107-08 (1890) (same).
Admitting Congress' power to create offices with terms of its choosing, however, opens the equally absolute possibility of major offices-even Cabinet posts-with terms so short that the Senate would have an effective power of removal through its ability to withhold consent from reappointment. The Court's holding in Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3189-91 (1986) (Congress' statutory reservation of power to remove Comptroller General by passing joint resolution-a statute-made him officer of legislative branch), raises the specter of a similar analysis being applied if the official's term were anything but co-extensive with the President's or the life of the agency, whichever is less. Cf United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) (Court avoids deciding claim that bill to cut off salaries of 39 named alleged subversives, unless reappointed by President, encroaches on executive power; holds instead that act was invalid bill of attainder).
Courts 
b. Limited Foreign Policy Powers Analogized to Domestic Powers
The President's war and foreign affairs powers extend further than presidential domestic powers. The President is Commander in Chief of the armed forces, not Commander in Chief of the entire government. As Commander in Chief, the President ordinarily has considerably more authority and independence from Congress in the military sphere than in domestic affairs. Similarly, the President ordinarily enjoys broader authority and initiative in foreign affairs. 8 5 If Congress can constrain the President's use of his inherent Commander in Chief or foreign affairs powers, it follows that Congress can apply at least as strong constraints to the removal power, an unenumerated, allegedly inherent, domestic power.
One recent analysis of the President's war and foreign affairs powers concluded that the "cases stand quite plainly for the proposition that the President can exercise a purportedly inherent power if Congress has historically acquiesced and if Congress does not try to stop him." 8 ' Congress has placed restrictions on the President's ability to dismiss a commissioned officer in peacetime; 87 it should be able to do no less with regard to do- 86. Carter, supra note 60, at 124 (emphasis in original). Professor Carter cautions that the intent of the Framers was "ambiguous," id. at 119, and that the older judicial precedents are "thin," id. at 120, but that nevertheless, "[t]he Court has been quite explicit in its avoidance" of defining Congress' power to limit the Commander in Chief power. Id. at 120 n.83 (citing cases in which Supreme Court notes congressional inaction); see also Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177-78 (1804) (congressional action, regarding authority of naval forces to seize foreign vessels, occupies field otherwise open to President's discretion); Van Alstyne, supra note 37, at 107 (necessary and proper clause assigns Congress authority to determine what powers executive will have beyond those deemed "indispensable").
87. 10 U.S.C. § 1161 (1982) forbids the dismissal of a commissioned officer in peacetime unless the officer is convicted by court-martial, absent without leave for three months, or sentenced to incar-mestic agency heads. Since the unfettered presidential removal power is at most an "inherent" power, a 8 the comparison to inherent war and foreign affairs powers suggests that Congress may "try to stop" the President from removing Heads of Departments.
The Intent of the Framers
Separation of powers implements the Framers' chief goal subordinate to the overriding aim of creating a functioning state-that of preventing a recurrence of the tyranny they associated with English rule. Montesquieu, an important influence on the Framers," 9 emphasized separation of government into starkly divided branches not as an end in itself, but as a means to protect against the tyranny that would result were powers concentrated in one branch or, worse, in one person. 9 0 Separation of powers is best understood as the structural realization of Montesquieu's goal of maximum feasible diffusion of power." 1 It should not be understood to require concentration of power in any one branch, and particularly not concentration of power in the executive branch, much less in the President." 3 The Framers envisioned Congress as the most powerful of the three branches. 93 The Framers saw Congress as the branch that could most safely be entrusted with the greatest power; concentration of power in unelected judges or in a single President too closely resembled the abuses associated with English rule. The Framers expected the President's domestic powers to be far less than the domestic powers of Congress. lated to specifically named presidential functions in Article 11.107 But the two other executive departments-the Post Office 0 8 and the Treasury 1 9 -were more insulated from presidential direction, with the latter tied particularly closely to Congress.' 1 Most Attorney Generals agreed with, or acquiesced in, the congressional view for the first seventy-five years of the Republic. 1 1
From the beginning, Congress not only restricted the President's authority to fire executive officials, but also narrowed the appointment power from which the removal power primarily derives." 2 Congress' undisputed power to create an office includes the corollary power to narrow the group from which the President may select civil officers. Congress has required that certain appointees have particular citizenship 13 or residence in a particular state, territory, or foreign country;' 1 4 it has required legal qualifications, 115 language proficiency, 1 and engineering17 or other professional credentials. 11 8 Further, at times Congress has constrained the President's appointment power by specifying the appointee's age, ' sex, 20 race, 21 property holdings, 2 2 business, 23 or drinking habits. 111. For example, If the laws, then, require a particular officer by name to perform a duty, not only is that officer bound to perform it, but no other officer can perform it without a violation of the law; and were the President to perform it, he would not only be not taking care that the laws were faithfully executed, but he would be violating them himself. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 624, 625 (1823) (Wirt); accord 13 Op. Att'y Gen. 28 (1869) (Hoar); 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 226 (1853); 4 Op. Att'y Gen. 515, 516 (1846) (Mason); 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 507 (1832) (Taney); cf. RuLEMAKING, supra note 20, at 32 n.154 (citing other examples drawn from 1823 to 1876).
Contra Letter from Attorney General Caesar A. Rodney to President Thomas Jefferson (July 15, 1808), reprinted in 10 F. Cas. 357-59 (courts lack jurisdiction to issue mandamus against officer following presidential directive; granting such writs would destroy executive branch); 7 Op. Att'y Gen. 453, 469-70 (1855) (Cushing) (other view would "so divide and transfer the executive power as utterly to subvert the Government").
112. Most of these statutes applied to federal officials below Cabinet rank, although all were "Officers of the United States" and many had no superior officer except, perhaps, the President. Nor are restrictions on the appointment power an historical relic: Since 1947, a person must have been a civilian for ten years to be eligible for appointment as Secretary of Defense or to other top Defense Department posts. 12 5 In addition, the President continues to be required to nominate some officials from different parties, 12 or on a nonpartisan basis. 1 27 At times, Congress has limited the President's choice to lists nominated by state officials, Indian tribes, or private citizens. 28 The limits of the congressional authority to define or restrict the presidential appointment power have never been tested. 2 "
C. Historical Allocation of Related Powers
Executive departments shielded from presidential control are a traditional, if relatively infrequently employed, congressional technique to ensure that important national tasks are accomplished when there is reason to fear presidential influence over implementation. Early examples of vesting important government functions in independent corporations, notably the Second Bank of the United States, appear functionally identical to the modern practice of vesting such powers in independent agencies. 1 " The Second Bank of the United States was a federally chartered corporation, but only one-fifth of its stock was owned by the United States. The Bank 128. Myers, 272 U.S. at 274 n.56 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 129. Congress' power to define the procedures by which lower-level federal employees are selected was affirmed in United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (upholding Hatch Act); see also United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886) (affirming congressional power to constrain presidential flexibility in appointment of inferior officers). The issue of Congress' power to define such procedures for higher-level officials is unlikely to arise in court because they require Senate confirmation. Were the President ever to appoint a person in violation of a statute, the Senate presumably would not confirm her. had twenty-five directors, five of whom were appointed by the President from among the stockholders, subject to Senate confirmation.
1 31 The remaining twenty directors-a comfortable majority-were elected by the other shareholders.' Although the President alone could remove any of the five directors he appointed, he had no power over the other directors.' While there were bitter divisions about the wisdom of having national banks, the courts resolved the issue of their constitutionality in favor of the banks' legitimacy.' 4 The Bank precedents suggest that Congress could assign the national functions performed by the Federal Reserve Board to a private, or semiprivate, federal corporation over whose officers the President might have even less control than he would over a non-presidential executive agency. Any federal function that Congress can put in private hands can afortiori be entrusted to an officer of the United States, either directly or through the fiction of service ex officio, regardless of the degree of control permitted the President. 
A. Determining What Congress May Commit to an Autonomous Agency
Congress acts on strong constitutional foundations when it unambiguously"' 8 seeks to insulate one of the many but not unlimited matters committed to the legislature by Article I from the President's political manipulation. Congress is weakest when facing the President's enumerated powers:
13 7 The President is the Commander in Chief, 138 and possesses a complex of foreign affairs powers, 13 9 the veto, 4 ' the pardon power, 4 " as well as other powers." " As one of the President's implied or "inherent" powers, the removal power is more susceptible to congressional modification than are enumerated powers, 1 43 but this should not become a congressional license to create executive agencies in order to encroach on presidential powers. gress can assign to non-presidential executive agents. 14 Enumeration, for example, allows one to determine that the Federal Reserve Board is constitutional. 148 Ultimate control over the powers it exercises is constitutionally committed to the legislature. Because the Constitution goes to special lengths to vest the control of money and finance solely in the Congress,' 147 and especially the House, 148 matters involving the effective use of this power are easily deemed executive rather than presidential.
49
Similar logic applies whenever Congress has good reason to believe that an Article I function is threatened. Thus, it would have been constitutional to create a substantially autonomous executive official to execute the 145. At the very least, considering enumerated powers-most of which are in Article I not Article II-will redress the pro-presidential imbalance fostered by undue emphasis on implications from the relatively vague phrases in Article II.
146. The Federal Reserve Board is the most important of the agencies for which Congress has permitted for-cause removal without specifying what might constitute sufficient cause. See supra note 1.
The legal status of the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board is murky. As a Member of the Board the Chairman holds a 14-year term and can be dismissed for (unspecified) cause. Appointment as Chairman, for which Membership is a prerequisite, requires separate confirmation by the Senate and runs for only four years, with tenure staggered to fall in the middle of a President's term. There is no specific removal procedure for the Chairman, and he is generally thought to be independent of the President. may also fall, but again, only because the Comptroller is legislative, not because he is protected from presidential removal.'" Finally, most other autonomous agencies without the power to bring civil enforcement actions 1 55 are on as firm ground as the Federal Reserve Board because their functions concern the regulation of commerce, a task committed to Congress. 56 Enumeration identifies many powers as either executive or presidential, but alone it cannot categorize them all. An appropriate supplemental criterion is whether Congress can assign the task in question to private organizations 15 7 -if the President can be cut out of administration entirely, he has no cause to complain if Congress assigns the task to an autonomous agency. 1986) , the Third Circuit found CICA to be constitutional because the comptroller's decisions on the merits of bid protests were legislative judgments which the executive can ignore. Although the executive might have to obey when the Comptroller increased the 90-day stay period (in some cases the head of a procuring agency can override a stay with an appropriate certification) the court found that the interference with the executive would be de minimis. Id. at 39-43. Following Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3260 (1986), the court held that a de minimis separation of powers violation need not be overturned, particularly when its result is to "effectuate[] . . . the 'proper balance' of power." Ameron, slip. op. at 40-41.
If indeed an usurpation of an executive power can be de minimis then perhaps CICA need not be overturned. If, by contrast, the Supreme Court applies a bright-line separation of powers principle, then even a small violation will suffice to invalidate CICA.
155. See supra note 1 (partial list of affected agencies); see also supra note 2 (reasons why list can only be partial 16, 1986) . For an example of such an argument, see supra note 135 and accompanying text. There are, of course, counter-arguments that the greater congressional power need not include the lesser in the separation of powers context. Any such argument, however, should carry a burden of proving that if adopted it would diffuse power among the branches, or otherwise increase individual freedom. tions' 59 No enumerated power determines whether all enforcement actions must be by an officer answerable to the President." 6 " Congress' ability to create private attorneys general to pursue civil enforcement actions" 6 ' suggests, however, that civil enforcement power could in theory be radically privatized, just as many traditionally governmental functions could in theory be turned over to federal corporations." If so, then the same a fortiori argument legitimates allowing non-presidential executive agencies to initiate civil enforcement actions. 1 6
B. The Limits of Autonomy
If the take care clause empowers the President, rather than creating a duty, 6 this should be understood to mean that it gives him the power to enforce the standard of governmental performance set by Congress, not to 159. See supra notes 3-5, 11 (agencies, including FTC, challenged). 160. The President could argue that the pardon power-which can be exercised before prosecution-implies exclusive presidential responsibility for criminal prosecutions, and perhaps civil prosecutions as well. Prosecutorial discretion, after all, is discretion not to prosecute, and thus analogous to a pre-prosecution pardon. In support of this view the President might note that the Supreme Court singled out the prosecutorial function, both civil and criminal, as uniquely deserving of absolute immunity against civil suits arising out of the performance of official duties by executive branch officials. Admittedly, tradition suggests particularly strongly that the criminal prosecution power should be electorally accountable. Perhaps fortunately therefore the FTC's enforcement power is purely civil; criminal prosecutions remain solely in the hands of persons directly accountable to the President.
161. See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
162.
See supra note 135.
163.
See supra text accompanying note 135. In any event, the President's pardon power will always remain the ultimate check were an agency to run rampant. There are fewer administrative obstacles to pardons than there are to impeachments.
164. See supra note 5 (authors holding this view).
create the standards themselves. 1 6 At most, therefore, the take care clause permits the President to suspend or remove department heads for good cause, as defined by Congress, such as engaging in criminal behavior, or exceeding their statutory authority. 1 " 6 Congress often states causes for removal, thereby setting standards of faithful execution for the President to enforce. Most independent agency heads may be removed for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office" and presumably no other cause. 167 The heads of certain other independent agencies are protected by very restrictive statutes. 68 Board members of the National Labor Relations Board are entitled to "notice and hearing" if the President should seek to remove them for either neglect or malfeasance. 1 6 9 The Labor-Management Relations Act demonstrates that Congress can offer a Head of Department substantial autonomy without infringing upon the President's legitimate supervisory role. This substantial protection should satisfy the congressional concerns behind the crea- art. II, § 3. The take care clause might also require that the President be allowed to fire officials for negligence. In any case, Congress has usually included inefficiency as one of the causes for presidential removal. See supra note 1 (statutes on removal of independent agency officers for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office").
If the Constitution permits Congress to restrict presidential removals to a "for cause" standard, does it also define what that standard is? In other words, does the necessary and proper clause allow Congress to define cause for removal, or does the take care clause require that the President be allowed to suspend or fire for particular offenses? One place to look for minimum standards might be the part of the Constitution that contains standards for removal-the impeachment clause's requirement of "high crimes and misdemeanors," the original understanding of which covered a relatively narrow range of subjects. See R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 53-102 (1973). Because these standards properly apply to removals by Congress, the best place to look for standards to apply to presidential removals is acts of Congress, which after all make up the very laws whose faithful execution the President is charged to oversee.
167. See supra notes 1-2. tion of so-called independent agencies. 1 7 0 A notice and hearing requirement allows Congress time to respond both formally and informally to a threatened dismissal, rather than to a presidential fait accompli. A notice and hearing requirement also creates due process rights which should allow judicial review of dismissals, for both the fairness of the hearing and perhaps the validity of the underlying allegation. 1 7 1 Without a hearing, a court might be reluctant to rule that a dismissal was improper, if only for lack of judicially cognizable standards. 172 
IV. CONCLUSION
Distinguishing between executive and presidential agencies reconciles the otherwise competing objectives of allowing Congress to structure the executive, shielding core presidential functions from legislative encroachment, and accommodating the Court's desire for a bright-line separation of powers. The distinction in Humphrey's Executor between "purely executive" functions and others, which can be assigned "independent" status, should be abandoned in favor of a taxonomy based on constitutionally committed powers, which preserves the holdings of existing cases and provides a coherent guide for the future.
170.
See supra notes 44-56 and accompanying text. Political realities being what they are, few Presidents will seek to remove an officer who is entitled to a public hearing unless there is good cause.
171. A notice and hearing requirement would also allow Congress to set the standard of review that courts should apply.
172. Congress has failed to specify removal procedures and thus to set a standard of faithful execution for the heads of several agencies. See supra note 1. But see supra note 165 (Supreme Court requires that there be some cause for firing of "quasi-judicial" officer).
